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Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
1.

Introduction

I should begin by ex-pressing appreciation for the opportunity offered me to be with you today
as the Special Guest of Honour and to deliver the keynote address on the occasion of the third in the
series of annual Central Bank of Nigeria in-house Executive Seminars organised by the Research
Department in collaboration with the Personnel Department. The first seminar, held in 1993, dealt
with the nex'US of policies pursued under the auspices of the Structural Adjustment Programme.
The second seminar, held in 1994, was on the theme: "The Nigerian Banking System: Policies,
Issues, Problems and Prospects".
At this juncture, I wish to note that a major objective of the Executive Policy Seminar is
to update our Executive staff's knowledge and understanding of economic and financial policy
issues and thereby enhance their contribution to policy design and implementation. Feedbacks
received indicate that this objective is already being realised.
The objective of the Executive Policy Seminar should, however, go beyond an understanding
of economic and financial policy issues. An occasional exercise in critical self-appraisal is highly
desirable. That is why the theme of this year's Seminar, namely: Central Banking - A Case
Study of The Central Bank of Nigeria, is unique and breaks new grounds. Furthermore, the
theme of this Seminar is highly relevant for the follow:ing reasons:
First, Central Banking is our business and devoting some time to discussing it, away
from the pressures of daily routine which tends to overwhelm most Executives these days, is
likely to offer rather interesting insights on how we stand.
Second, the CBN has for sometime now, especially in the last one year, received a rather
bad press and, whether deserved or not, this is not a desirable state of affairs. It is, therefore,
necessary to find out at a seminar such as this, what had gone wrong and how we could put
things tight in order to ·redeem our dented corporate image. Of priority importance is the need
to evolve an effective information management strategy to explain developments in the economy
and CBN's role and measures.
Third, this seminar offers an opportunity for an informed discussion on the highly
topical issue of CBN autonomy.
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I have perused the Seminar's programme and noted that
there are 14 technical sessions devoted to the m a in theme and sub-themes on some
• Mr V.A Odozi is the Deputy Governor, Domestic Monetary and Banking Policy. Central Bank of Nigeria.
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critical aspects of the Bank's operations. It is, therefore, a very rich agenda of relevant issues and I
am indeed delighted to be involved in raising some of the leading issues even ifl would not address
them in detail.
2.

The CbaHenges Facing the CBN

In setting the ball rolling, as it were, I intend to share with you my thoughts and
concerns on some of the challenges currently facing the Central Bank in its major areas of
operation.
First, the Central Bank is called upon to do far more than is practicable at a given point. For
instance, the commercial banks have been complaining that we are competing with them in retail
banking. I am also aware that quite a number of informed impartial observers are critical about the
CBN being saddled with retail banking functions through the maintenance of chequing accounts
for pubblic sector institutions of various descriptions. It is, of course, recognised that a Central
Bank in a developing country would have to undertake a number of non-traditional central banking
functions, especially where there are no other institutions that could provide such services in a safe
and efficient manner. However, where such institutions exist or have emerged,
maintaining the non-traditional functions involves high opportunity costs i.e. it is detrimental to
the perfonnance of the more traditional functions such as monetary policy management and
banking supervision, there is a strong case for rationalisation of the functions of the Central Bank,
to give increased focus and channel resources to the achievement of its major goals, namely, price
stability, currency issue and the safety, soundness and efficiency of the banking
system.
Second, the challenges that face the Central Bank of Nigeria are legion and I cannot,given the
constraints of time, begin to articulate them here. I intend to highlight them in the expectation that,
at the appropriate times during the technical sessions, you would explore the issues in some depth.
The challenges include the achievement of price stability; effective banking regulation and
supervision, including the designing of an effective framework for resolving banking sector failure/
distress; the restoration of confidence in the system; checking the increased incidence of fraud;
payment system reform; and in-house capacity building and management succession. The issues
subsumed under the above list of challenges are far-reaching and would perhaps require another
seminar to do justice to them. However, I hope that some attention would be given to them on this
occasion.

3.

The Issue of Central Bank Autonomy

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, on an occasion such as this, where the theme is Central
Banking, it would be appropriate for me to make some observations on the issue of greater
autonomy for the Central Bank of Nigeria. Whether we call it independence or autonomy, there is
need from the start to state what it does not mean!
Autonomy does not mean that the CBN is absolutely independent of Government. It does not
mean that the CBN is above the laws of the land or unaccountable to nobody. It also does not mean
that the CBN has absolute freedom to spend and award contracts irrespective of the value. Finally,
it does not mean that the CBN is free to choose its goal or mandate.
The second observation I wish to make is that in the last decade or so there has been a global
trend towards increased central bank independence. This development followed the world-wide
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acceleration of inflation especially in the l 970's. In this connection, with the failure offiscal policy
in most countries, as embattled governments and vote~eing politicians sought to achieve their
aims by resorting to money-printing, it was recognised that only central banks, insulated from
executive/political pressures and given an anti-inflation mandate, could ensure the
achievement of price stability.
Third, in the realm of economic theory, two developments have served the cause of central
bank independence: the first was the death of the so-called Phillips Curve i.e. the recognition that,
afterall, there was no long-tenn trade-off between inflation and employment. The second was the
failure of the monetarist experiment in America and, ipso facto, the Friedman's solution of"rules
rather than discretion" - the so-called 'K ' per cent rule.
To complete the theoretical foundation, I wish to mention the theory of public choice which is
often introduced into the discussion of central bank independence to justify the proposition that
central bank officers do not serve the public interest but their own and, therefore, should not be
entrusted with much discretion. This allegation has been effectively countered by the argument
that the self esteem of central bank officers is enhanced by the achievement of their major mandate,
- namely, price stability, which enhances the public good.
My fourth observation is that if there is any doubt that the case for central bank independence
has a sound theoretical foundation, there is no doubt about the empirical evidence which is
overwhelming. The finding is that "the higher the degree of independence of a central bank, the
lower, as a rule, the average rate of inflation, and the smaller are the fluctuations in a country's price
movements" (O.lssing, 1993). Furthermore, there is some positive correlation between the
independence of a central bank and economic perfonnance. This is amply demonstrated by the fact
that the more independent central banks are those of the more developed economies. It is, therefore, not surprising that Germany whose central bank, the Bundesbank, is ranked as the most
independent also has the most stable currency in the world and consistently good economic perfor-

mance.
Fifth Observation: I have tried to state what central bank autonomy, in the Nigerian context,
is not! I have even made a case for it without defining what it is. Now, I would like to expatiate on
what central bank autonomy should be. First of all, we need to distinguish between goal/mandate
independence and instrument independence. Goal independence implies that the central bank is
free to choose its goal or mandate. Instrument independence, on the other hand, means that after
the goal or mandate had been determined by the appropriate political authority e.g. Government or
the National Assembly, the Central Bank should be free to select the appropriate instruments for the
achievement of that mandate. Specifically, the concept of central bank independence, envisaged in
the Nigeria context, embraces the determination of the goal of the Central Bank by the Executive/
Legislative authorities; the granting of powers nnder the law to the Bank to select and use suitable
instruments to fulfil that mandate; and accountability by the Bank for its performance through
periodic reporting to and reviews by the relevant Executive/Legislative authorities. Additionally, it
implies freedom from Executive and political pressures on the Bank to act against its better
judgement or in a manner inconsistent with the achievement of its mandate. Finally, it implies the
endowment of the Bank with enhanced powers to act more promptly and decisively in dealing with
distressed institutions and erring officers of banks.
In my view, the above model of central bank independence not only addresses the need for an
effective vehicle for dealing with the problem of entrenched inflation but also talces care of the
concerns about central bank independence, such as alleged "democratic deficit" or the theory of
public choice. With respect to the problem of policy co-ordination, which might arise with the
advent of an independent central bank, there are a number of possible solutions. However, the one
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I find most relevant is the estabHshment of a Committee on Fiscal and Monetary Policies with a
clearly defined mandate. Such a committee would provide a forum for policy consultation,
clarification, harmonisation and review.
Before concluding this contribution to the discussion on the subject of central bank
independen.,;e, I would like to clear some myths or wrong notions often encountered in debates on
the subject. One is that prior to Decrees 24 and 25 of 1991, the CBN was under or subservient to the
Federal Ministry of Finance. The true position, however, is that the relationship was one of
co-ordinate powers. For while the day-to-day management of the Bank was under the direction of
the Governor, the Board of Directors whose Chairman was and still is the Governor, had defined
powers with respect to the formulation of monetary policy and the administration of the Bank.
Furthermore, the relationship between the Minister c-f Finance and the CBN Board was clearly
defined. For instance, the CBN was required by the CBN Act of 1969 to submit its monetary policy
proposals to the Minister of Finance for presentation before the Council of Ministers. In the event
that the Minister disagreed with the CBN proposals he was required to submit his own proposals
side-by-side with those of the CBN unabridged to Government. What greater concept of coordinate
powers could there have been than what was manifested by the above statutory arrangement!
The second myth relates to powers of the CBN under the limited autonomy granted in 1989
and confirmed by the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 . In this connection, opponents of CBN autonomy
have alleged that this was the period when the Ways and Means Advances got out of hand and the
CBN became unduly powerful and unsupervised! This is a long story, but I shall abridge it by
stating that the allegation is unfounded and that, in any case, the antidote to undue reliance on the
CBN to finance ever - increasing fiscal deficits is to have a central bank that is sufficiently autonolllOlli and insulated from Executive and political pressures. I should also make the point that
although there is an operating clause in the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991, which appears to confer
some element of instrument independence on the CBN by specifying that the total outstanding
amount of temporary advances granted to Government should not exceed 12.5% of the estimated
Budget revenue, the preamble in Section 8, which gives the President residual powers, has undermined that independence. Further constraints on CBN autonomy were imposed by some sections of
the BOFI Decree No 25 of 1991 which provide for prior Presidential approval and thus limit CBN's
discretion to act in dealing with terminally distressed banks and errant bank directors and staff.

CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude this address by stating that the Bank has enormous responsibilities
and faces serious challenges. The anguish of central banking in Nigeria over the last decade or so
has been the undue and mandatory financing of the entrenched fiscal deficit by the CBN against
the Bank's better judgement! It has led to the reintroduction of stabilisation securities for which the
CBN has persistently been condemned by all and sundry. While recognising the high opportunity
cost of using stabilisation securities, we are left with no viable option to deal with the persistent
excess liquidity in the banking system and severely constrained by the lack of a flexible interest rate
anchor to malce Open Market Operations viable. It must, however, be stated for the records that this
Administration has demonstrated both the political will and the discipline to achieve fiscal viability
- for instance, the fiscal deficit for the first half of 1995 was the lowest in several years. There are
indications that this dawn of fiscal restraint would continue.
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Moreover, we also face the daunting task of resolving the deep-seated banking industry
distress and restoring confidence to that sector. Here again, this Administration has been
consistently supportive if not proactive by putting in place a most robust and comprehensive
supervisory intervention framework as evidenced by the liquidation of terminaJly distressed banks
and the stringent law against insider abuses and financial malpractices in banks. This record is
unparalleled in the history of banking regulation in Nigeria. I am inclined lo believe that we are
now on the threshold of a major breakthrough in distress resolution in this country.
In spite of the recent achievements, there is a missing link, namely: a CBN with greater
autonomy. Our hope and vision is for a CBN that has instrument independence; freedom to select
apprQpriate instruments for the achievement of its mandate; and which is free from executive or
political pressure to act against its better judgement and at the same time is responsive, responsible
and accountable. I, of course, recognise that although formal independence is a major condition for
better macroeconomic performance, it is not a sufficient condition. The bank must win greater
freedom, acceptance, prestige and authority through its track record ofcredible performance. Above
all, it must demonstrate sound technical competence, professionalism and integrity in its actions.
This is a challenge that must be met if any meaning is going to be made of independence - formal.
operational or de facto! I would also stress that the Research Department has a major role to play in
determining the amount of influence and respect we enjoy as a Central Bank: At this juncture, I
wish lo reinforce the case for Central Bank autonomy by quoting Dr. Otrnar lssing of the German
Bundesbank.
".... in principle, resistance to making the central bank independent always reflects the
intention of reserving access to money creation to policy makers. This has never been good
for the value of money anywhere. In view of the temptations inherent in the political process,
a society can signal its determination to safeguard the stability of money only by choosing the
appropriate institutional arrangement. In this context, the independence of the central bank
comes top of the list."
On both pragmatic and utilitarian grounds, there is a compelling case for greater CBN
autonomy and certainly not less. It is, therefore, our hope that the new epoch of economic
liberalism and institutional innovation now prevailing in Nigeria would induce a radical rethinking
on the status of the Bank and bring about the desired change for greater autonomy.
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I commend the vision of the Research and Personnel
Departments in initiating this annual series of policy-oriented seminars. This year's edition
promises to be particularly stimulating and value-adding given the very topical theme and
sub-themes and the array of high profile resource persons being mobilised lo handle the various
technical sessions. I wish to confirm Management's continued support for this worthwhile
initiative in capacity building.
It is now my pleasure and privilege to declare the 3rd CBN Executive Seminar open.
I urge all participants to be actively involved in all aspects of the proceedings of the Seminar to
maximise its benefits both to staffand the Bank. As usual, we expect the Seminar Proceedings to be
published by the Research Department in good time. I wish all of you a successful and fulfilling
occasion.

